LEGAL LOG by South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy
c8t"ts
3 .L 3.3
S. C. STATT LIBRARV
AUG 7 tgBE
;,ii t"JirLiENT€
vol.,. 3 rw. 5 MAY 1985
Breathless:
fnplied consent, blood samples and
presumptions after State v. Carrigan
From time to tirne the law enforcenent
conmunity reaches a polnt st hrhich it be-
cones familiar and comfortable with a tool
shich it has found to be especially ef-fective in the presentation of the prosecu-
tion cese. On occasion, however, this com-fort and farniliarity may be shaken by a
court's ruling that the tool is being in-
correctly applied. lJhen this happens steps
nugt be taken to insure that, if worth-
vhile, the tool is once again put to proper
use, ff not, its usate should be stopped.
The tool in this instance is the South
Carolina fmplied Consent st,atute, section
56-5-2950 of the South Carolina Code. The
ruling is the South Carolina Court of Ap-peals opinion in State v. Carrigan, dated
llarch 12, 19E5 (0pinion lrlurnber 0415).
Although the court's opinion in Carrigar!
examines several issues, perhaps the most
inportant Eo street officers is the dis-
cuesion of section 56-5-2950, the South
Cerolina fnplied Consent statute, and the
nethod by which a defendant's intorication,for purposes of the DUf stat,ute(55-5-2930), msy be proved.
The facts in Carrigan were basicaLly as
follows:
Carrigan, his wife and his wife's cousin
were involved in a one car accident in
which Carrigan was the driver. Carrigan's
wife wag kllled and Carrlgan and the cousin
were inJured. The South Carolina HighwayPatrol frooper rho lnvestigated the icci_
dent later testified at t,rial that Carrigan
was "highly intoricated." Further evidence
at the trial showed that Carrigan had been
taken to a nearby hospital for treatnent ofhis injuries received in the accident. A
technician fron the hospital to which
Carrigan had been taken testified that a
blood sanple dram fron hin was tested,
revealing a bl.ood/alcohol content of ,'154
nilligrans per deciliter". The technician
confirmed "that the reading is the sane aspoint one-sir-four (.154) of a breathalyzer
test. "
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Baeed on the above facts and evidence,
Carrigan sas convicted of DUf and Reckless
Honiclde.
fn proving Carrigan's guilt the State
relied upon the South Carolina Implied Con-
sent statute. Ihe statute, which is en-
titled "fnplied consent to chenical test to
deternine alcoholic contont of blood...",
provldes, in part, ln subeectlon (a):
"The test shall be adninistered at the
direction of a law enforcenent officer who
haa apprehended a person while driving a
notor vehicle upon the public highways of
this State while under the infl.uence of
lntoricat,ing liquor. The test shall be
a&ninistered by a person trained and certi-fied by the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Dlvlslon, using nethods approved by the
South Carolina l.aw Enforcement Division."
Subsection (b) provides, in part:
"In any crininal prosecution for the
violation of section 56-5-2930 relatint to
driving a vehicle under the influence of
intoricating liquor, the anount of alcohol
in the defendant's blood at the tirne of the
alleged violation, as shom by chemical
analysis of the defendant's breath, shall
give rise to the following presumptions."(Enphasis added. )
Subsection (b) then goes on to provide
for presumptions based on the alcohol found
in a defendant's blood, anont which is the
presunption that if there eras ten
one-hundredths of one percent (.10X) or
nore by weight of alcohol in a defendant's
blood, it shall be presumed that the
defendant was under t,he influence of in-
toricating liquor.
On appeal from the convictions Carrigan
raised, anong other issues, three very
lmportant argunents concerning the fnplied
Consent statute:
First, as indicated above, subsection (a)
reguires thaL the chemical test be admin-
istered "at the direction of a law enf6rce-
nent officer who has apprehended aperson..." who was driving while under the
influence.
Second, subsection (a) requires that the
"...test shall be adninistered by a person
trained and certified by the South Cerolina
Lar Enforcement Division. . . ".
Third, as indicated above, subsection (b)
allows the presunption that a defendant was
under the influence of intoricating liquorif there was ten one-hundredths of one
percent (.101) of alcohol in the
defendant's blood based upon a ". . . chemical
analysis of the defendant's breath..."(enphasis added).
fn all three argurnents the Court of
Appeals agreed with Carrigan. The court
noted that there was no evidence to indi -
cate that the arresting officer had re-
quested the test; that the technician who
performed the test was trained and certi-
fied by SLED or that, most besic of all,
the tegt was one of Carrigan's breath, ag
required by the statute.
Although the Court not,ed that a blood
test could be used to convict a defendant
of DUI, it could not raise the sane pre-
sunption which a breath test could raise by
statute. Further, the court noted, use of
a blood test would require testimony fron
an erpert interpreting it.
For the foregoing reasons the Court of
Appeals reversed Carrigan's convictions for
DUf and Reckless Honicide and returned his
case to the Court of General Sessions for a
new trial on the charges.
The lesson to be learned fron Carrigan is
that, although the Impl.ied Consent statute
is a very useful t.ooI for law enforcenentin the proof of DUf cases, it should be
used appropriately. Specifically, the pre-
sunption of intoxicat,ion created by sub-
section (b) of the statuLe applies only to
a "chemical analysis of the defendant's
!!ea!h-" not to a blood test. As well, the
"analysis of the defendant's breath," which
will nean a "Breathalyzer" test, nust be at
the request of an officer who apprehended
the defendant while drivint on a public
highway and must be perforned by I person
trained and certified by SLED. A blood
test does not neet the above reguirenents
and to have its results adnitted, must bequalified by erpert testinony: a rnuch moredifficult task.
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